The Chinese political economy is a dynamic entity constituted by multiple developmental trajectories. Recent debates on two seemingly divergent 'models' in the subnational regions of Chongqing and Guangdong has foregrounded the potential contradictions of this dynamism. While existing research has attempted to evaluate these trajectories as outcomes of elite politics or ideological incommensurability, an overlooked but no less important aspect is the connections between these trajectories, Mao-era regulatory policies and the post-1978 system of reciprocal accountability. Synthesizing empirical materials from policy documents, academic commentaries, statistical data and interviews with planners from China, this paper provides a critical evaluation of these connections.
egalitarianism through housing and migration policies; and a hard-handed campaign against organized crime (Huang, 2011; Su et al, 2011; You and Lei, 2013; Lim, 2014a) . Also construed as (re)instituting the rule by law, prominent critics such as Hu Deping (the son of Hu Yaobang, key reform-minded ally of Deng Xiaoping), Xu Youyu (senior academic) and Wen Jiabao (the-then Premier of China) have gone to the extent of labelling the socioeconomic policies in Chongqing as the "line of thought" (siwei 思维) and "spirit" (yinhun 阴魂) of a particular "historical tragedy" (lishi beiju 历史悲剧) -the Cultural Revolution (Apple Daily, 15 March 2012; Ming Bao, 4 December 2012; Xu, 2013) .
Further research into these seemingly incommensurable models is generating nuanced interpretations. One body of work views these different trajectories as outcomes of elite politics and the quest for a consensus-based political structure (Zhao, 2012; Cheng, 2013; Zheng, 2013; Lynch, 2015) . Here, the focal point is on the conflictual political agendas of specific actors in the party-state apparatus. Another body views the developmental approaches in Chongqing and Guangdong as expressions of regional capitalist varieties that could coexist and possibly constitute the structural coherence of the national political economy (Huang, 2012; Mulvad, 2015; Zhang and Peck, 2015) . While offering fresh insights into postMao socioeconomic reforms, what remains unclear in existing research is the relationship between these 'models' and the broader geographical-historical context of Chinese state formation after 1949. Drawing from policy documents, academic commentaries, statistical data and interviews with planners from China 1 , this paper addresses this lacuna.
To be clear, the empirical analysis is not meant to provide an exhaustive summary of policies, career politics or for that matter ideological metonym: these are already discussed at length elsewhere (Dirlik 2012a (Dirlik , 2012b Cheng 2015; Godement 2015, 17-27; Li 2016) . Rather, it makes for a singular contribution through synthesizing key materials to demonstrate how these two supposed 'models' are neither divergent pathways nor two sides of the same coin. Divergence is predicated on a priori unity; on a previously existing 'same coin' characterized by a coherent national structure and historical exceptionalism. Yet there was never such unity and uniqueness to begin with; differences between CPC cadres have always existed at both ideological and practical levels. Place-specific development therefore does not comprise differentiated parts of a larger empirical entity known widely today as the 'China model'. By extension, inter-regional variations do not reflect chronological differences that would naturally 'level up' as one exceptional whole. The Chongqing and Guangdong trajectories are not compared against a template of fixed factors for this reason; their respective socioeconomic policies and economic data have to be evaluated as geographically-and historically-grounded expressions of the joint demands of national regulation and transnational capital reproduction.
The discussion is organized in four parts. Section 2 delineates the geographical-historical context within which the analysis is framed. Section 3 then explain how the Guangdong and Chongqing trajectories came to be. It shows how
conditions that shaped what appear today to be two distinct developmental approaches are constituted by dynamic interactions between local initiatives and agents positioned at different scales (the provincial, regional, national and supranational). An evaluation of these approaches is presented in section 4. The implications of these outcomes on the 'chessboard' philosophy and 'ladder step' logic will be explored in the concluding section.
The 'chessboard' regulatory philosophy: emergence and contemporary implications
The "China" that Mao Zedong's Communist Party of China (CCP) sought to "liberate" in the late 1940s was constituted by a patchwork of socio-culturally disparate economies. As Fitzgerald (1995: 75) puts it, China was (and arguably remains) a 'nationless state' constituted by "the motif of a unitary state reconstituting itself from the rubble of a disintegrating empire". What this meant in economic-geographical terms was an absent national economy of China; there were many territorially-distinct economies in China. When it became clear that the CPC would succeed in capturing power in Beijing, the imminent military success transposed into a challenge to integrate these economies into a structurally coherent nation-state. This process was a major encumbrance to the CPC's state building objectives because the geopolitical dimensions of 'new China' were slippery at the edges and unstable within.
Fundamental to the CPC's success in the 'protracted people's war' in October 1949 was its ability to share power -albeit in an ad hoc manner -with leaders of regional economies since the 1920s (Gurley, 1976; van de Ven, 1992; Groot, 2004) .
After securing political power, its first major regulatory strategy was to fortify its political control through re-designating spatial divisions of regulation. To this end, six 'big strategic regions' were created (dazhanlüequ 大战略区). These regions were, namely, North China (Huabei 华北), Northeast China (Dongbei 东北), East China (Huadong 华东), Central and South China (Zhongnan 中南), Northwest China (Xibei 西北) and Southwest China (Xinan 西南). Before long, however, parts of the new administration (including Mao himself) feared potential provincialism could morph into reality and undermine the fragile coherence and stability of 'new China'. For this reason, the six newly-appointed regional leaders -Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai -were re-deployed to Beijing in 1952 and 1953 and two of them, Gao and Rao, were purged from their positions in 1954 (ref. Teiwes, 1990; Shiraev and Yang, 2014) . These regions were then swiftly dissolved.
Accompanying the re-elevation of the provincial scale as the second highest level of administration was a growing emphasis on the necessity to align local interests to national goals. Understanding this political emphasis on the 'national interest' is important for framing the Chongqing-Guangdong relationship and, more importantly, for understanding why Bo Xilai was purged in 2012 (ref. section 3). As it emerged that disparate local practices were undermining the Great Leap Forward industrialization project, the-then Shanghai Mayor, Ke Qingshi, urged national socioeconomic coordination in an article in the Party's leading journal, Red Flag (红 旗). This article has now attained touchstone status in Chinese policymaking and academic circles due to its metaphor 'the whole country as a chessboard':
Regardless of class struggle or struggle in economic production, regardless of any form of work, planning, doing things, thinking about problems, there must be a holistic view…This entire agenda correctly reflects the relationship between different departments in the economy and the relationship between the whole and the partial, it makes clear they are intertwined into a national chessboard, not a board of scattered sand. (Ke, 1959; authors' translation) Ke's article delineates two regulatory considerations of relevance for framing the Chongqing-Guangdong relationship in this paper: centralized economic control and political balance between different administrative levels. In the context of the Great Leap Forward, the implication was to prioritize the funneling of resources for the prevailing national economic project and, in turn, preclude an "imbalanced" situation between the national goal and local agendas. The 'chessboard' regulatory metaphor would soon resonate in the speeches of the senior leadership.
In spite of these proclamations, the 'chessboard' philosophy neither led the Great Leap Forward program to success nor enhanced economic production during the Mao era. The chaos during and unprecedented death toll that followed the Great Leap Forward impelled Mao to adopt more radical measures to consolidate political power in Beijing. This was launched through the Third Front Construction program in 1964 (sanxian jianshe 三线建设), on the premise of growing threats from 'imperialism and their running dogs' (diguozhuyi jiqizougou 帝国主义及其走狗). Mao ordered means of production to be relocated from the coastal city-regions (the 'First Front') to those in the relatively sheltered interior (the 'Third Front').
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The intensification of the ideological-political campaign against domestic political rivals meant economic reconstruction slowed down during the first two years of the Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) . To ensure absolute political control, cell-like administrative units were tied hierarchically to Beijing in tandem with geo-economic insulation (under the nationalistic slogan of 'self-sufficiency'). The central government granted significant autonomy to the provinces to self-finance developmental projects.
In return, a minimal trade policy was enforced. For almost a full decade prior to the 1978 reforms, the 'Chinese economy' resembled a customs union more than a common market; it was an entity with a common barrier against the global economy, within which free trade did not exist. What existed across the rural communes and urban danwei was effectively a "cellular" and "fragmented" economic structure that comprised of cell-like, self-sufficient and regionally uneven administrative units (Donnithorne, 1972; Tsui, 1991; Bray, 2005) . More interestingly, the unwillingness of these units to work with one another meant the 'chessboard' philosophy regularly encountered resistance.
The conflicts generated by this cellular and protectionistic structure ultimately triggered experimental reforms after Deng Xiaoping took over the CPC leadership from Hua Guofeng in 1978. Calculations within different levels of government continued to prioritize self-interest and competitive advantage through the 1980s, which led to what Oi (1992) terms "local state corporatism". Under this mode of governance, which had deep historical antecedents, local cadres managed their jurisdictions as if they were businesses, and sought to out-compete other territories in order to gain promotional opportunities (Chien and Gordon, 2008; Xu, 2011; cf. Bell 2015, 182-188) . This unsurprisingly generated tensions with the previously mentioned system of reciprocal accountability. As the next section will elaborate, fierce inter-territorial competition persists in the present and underpins the contemporary positioning of Chongqing and Guangdong within the national 'chessboard'.
Working on the premise of pragmatism and yet cautious not to jettison the Marxist-Leninist ideological foundations of the CPC, the Deng Xiaoping government built on this legacy of inequality through a developmental approach known as the 'ladder-step transition theory', or tidu tuiyi lilun (梯度推移理论). First espoused by the Shanghai-based academics Xia Yulong and Feng Zhijun (1982) , this prescriptive 'theory' attracted the attention of a senior CPC cadre, Bo Yibo, and subsequently permeated central policymaking circles. It was instituted as a policy blueprint during the 7
th Five-Year Plan (1986 -1990 At the same time, however, the implementation of this approach within a nationally-oriented spatio-temporal framework assured party conservatives the 'chessboard' approach to national governance remained relevant (cf. Wang and Hu, 1999; Zhu, 2003; Lin, 2004) . Deng made this point clear in a 1988 publication "Two Big Pictures" (liangge daju 两个大局):
The coastal areas must accelerate its opening up to enable this broad region of 200 million people to first develop, from which it will stimulate even better development in the interior. This is a matter that involves a big picture. The interior must understand this big picture.
Deng was, however, more specific in his exposition than Mao on the issue of sociospatial egalitarianism: he identified an equally important 'big picture', which entailed residents of the coastal provinces to reciprocate the party-state's decision to first implement reforms in their provinces by accepting the subsequent redistribution of accumulated value accruing from economic liberalization for the development of the interior.
Accompanying this global economic (re)engagement was the development of a regulatory system that 'play to the provinces' by encouraging more developmental initiatives from provincial leaders. Integral to this system is what Shirk (1993) Crucially, however, the coastal-interior income and output gap persisted during Hu Jintao's presidency (2003 . More globally-engaged firms were increasingly clustered in the coastal regions (He et al, 2008; Ge, 2009) . These trends highlight, in turn, the tensions between the 'chessboard' philosophy of interregional economic integration and the fragmentary effects of post-Mao instituted uneven development (cf. Poncet, 2005; Howell, 2006; Chen and Zheng, 2008) .
Against this backdrop, pushbacks in the form of apparently competing 'models', all in search for a greater share of the economic pie, began to emerge. As section 3 will show, local state proactivity to institute more egalitarian policies in Chongqing and launch investor-friendly projects were direct outcomes of Deng's 'ladder step' approach, as was the ability of the Guangdong government to build on its initial economic success by calling for more political openness. Yet, pace Heilmann and
Perry (2011), these different responses cannot be construed as distinct intra-national models competing for eventual national supremacy; their respective policies now respond, simultaneously and directly, to the twofold demands of transnational capital reproduction and inherited national-level institutions. At one level, the intensifying engagement with foreign capital generated new demands of the Guangdong government. This was primarily attributed to transparency requirements and the growing consciousness of a new middle class.
The Guangdong and
Xiao Bin, a leading China-based observer of reforms in Guangdong, explains why this led to a more advanced administrative system that underpinned the muchcelebrated 'Guangdong model':
The reason why the administrative and public services are better in Guangdong relative to other places is because the degree of marketization is higher. The pressure of the market on the government is higher. So many businesspersons and excellent entrepreneurs here, like in Shenzhen, place demands on the government, if services are not good they will move their headquarters away, so will the government play the game? Pressures from the public are also a factor, this is because social organization is active and the awareness of public rights are relatively higher, citizens are more proactive in enforcing their rights, which impels the government to provide better services. (Xiao Bin, interview with Time Weekly, 19 May 2015; authors' translation).
It is important to note, however, that the putative provision of better services has no causal relationship with the decline of state authoritarianism. While foreign capital investments generated GDP growth in Guangdong (and also along the eastern seaboard), a large private capitalist class capable of undercutting CPC interests did not emerge concomitantly (cf. Dickson, 2008; Walter and Howie, 2011) . What 'red capitalism' in Guangdong exemplifies, rather, is the ability of the CPC to subsume the enlargement of the non-state economic sector to party goals. Zhang (2013 Zhang ( : 1614 puts (Huang and Sharif, 2009; Meyer et al, 2012) . What ensued, instead, were intra-provincial polarization and a recognition that externally-driven growth was unsustainable (Lu and Wei, 2007; Wei and Liao, 2012 Rather than signal a move towards a smaller government and deepening market-like rule, a two-pronged response to reconfigure the provincial industrial structure was instituted. First introduced was an industrial policy known as "double relocation" (shuang zhuanyi 双转移). This involved shifting labor categorized as 'lowskilled' and firms categorized as "high in pollution, high in energy use and low in efficiency" (lianggao yidi 两高一低) from the core Pearl River Delta region to the underdeveloped regions of the province. Accompanying this policy were attempts to 1) encourage inflows of higher-order industries to leverage on the PRD's growing reputation as an info-communications hub and 2) 'scale up' the national significance of three "nationally strategic new areas" (guojia zhanlüe xinqu 国家战略新区) 5 in the PRD, namely Hengqin (横琴), Qianhai (前海) and Nansha (南沙), in 2009, 2010 and 2012 respectively. These intra-urban territories were subsequently designated subprovincial status and currently function as sites of policy experimentation in domains deemed to be of significance to both the Chinese central government and the economies of Macau and Hong Kong SARs. This two-pronged approach was officially termed 'emptying the cage, changing the birds' (tenglong huanniao 腾笼换 鸟), the 'cage' referring to an economy regulated by the CPC, and the 'birds' referring to firms that require some flying space to survive and thrive. Underpinning this approach was a straightforward political objective to fortify Guangdong's leading position within the national structure of socioeconomic development. Problems emerged when provincial-level path generation undermines preexisting national-level logics of socioeconomic regulation. The implementation of the 'double relocation' policy reflects the extension of the previously mentioned "political logic" of reforms that invites developmental initiatives of national significance from local governments (Shirk, 1993; see also Ma, 2005; Sheng, 2010) .
At the same time, however, the policy was contested because not all senior policymakers felt the 'double relocation' policy would generate national-level benefits.
As previously mentioned in section 2, CPC policymakers have been preoccupied with effective national governance. While the regulatory context of the 1950s differed significantly from that of contemporary China, the 'chessboard' philosophy continues to underpin central policymaking (Webber et al, 2002; Zhao, 2009 ). Opposition to the 'double relocation' policy emerged against this backdrop: some senior cadres did not construe it as a strategic 'move' vis-à-vis the national 'chessboard'.
Tensions between these two pathways developed consequently. At the national level, the designation of the three "nationally strategic" territories 'scaled up' the importance of Guangdong province to the central government and consolidated Deng Xiaoping's 'ladder step' logic of economic development. Its rationale was to facilitate new capital into Guangdong just as industries deemed redundant were either relocated to the outlying parts of the province or were allowed to shut down without further state support. These territories were then incorporated within the broader Guangdong Free Trade Zone, launched officially in April 2015. The zone currently offers more liberal policies on credit inflows from Hong Kong and Macau.
Accompanying this series of state-driven industrial reconfiguration was strong GDP growth in the aftermath of the crisis (ref. Figure 1 ).
While it is premature to ascertain the impact of policy experimentation in these areas, the national designation engendered a fresh wave of fixed capital 1949 1952 1957 1962 1965 1970 1975 1978 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) and the Chinese civil war (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) . and relatively poor population, the Sichuan provincial government was presented with the new logistical challenge of resettling and then re-employing the affected residents without further straining its administrative and fiscal resources. An important alternative at the time was the proposal to create a new province known as the Three Gorges (sanxia sheng 三 峡省). This proposal was soon jettisoned, however, on the grounds that establishing a new province would engender costly administrative duplication and unnecessary politics (Fan et al, 2001; Zhang, 2015) .
Chongqing was identified as a more feasible location for the population resettlement issue because Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan, was not Source: Authors' compilation.
Underpinning this proactive intervention, as the Chongqing Mayor, Huang
Qifan, points out, was the fact that Deng's 'ladder step' regulatory policies led to an acute lack on investor interest in developing Chongqing (and by extension the broader interior):
To repair a freeway along the coast, the local government does not have to come up with money, there could be 10 companies competing for this, someone could even engineer a 'grey transaction' to obtain this project. In the western region, however, getting one boss to construct freeway is a challenge, let alone attracting 10. At the time [2002] [2003] ] I wanted to repair 2000km of freeways, which required investments of up to 100 billion yuan [~US$12.1 billion, in 2002 prices]. With the-then backward conditions, no private domestic or foreign firms were willing to invest in infrastructural construction. This thrusted plans for urban transformation and development into a culde-sac. (Huang, in Chongqing Ribao, 12 July 2010; authors' translation) As a result of this lack of market interest, Huang explains, state intervention became a "necessary" precondition for Chongqing to move ahead with its agenda: billion yuan in 2000 to 1.8 trillion yuan in 2013, a twelve-fold increase (Huang, 2006: 20; Caijing, 20 January 2014) . Working with then-Mayor Wang Hongju and ViceMayor Huang Qifan, Wang was also the key driver of experimental attempts to integrate urban and rural development (chengxiang tongchou) -and in turn overhaul the intrinsically discriminatory urban-rural dual structure instituted in 1958 -during his tenure in Chongqing (see Huang, 2011; Lim, 2014 ).
Bo's so-called 'socialistic' reforms were launched on the basis of this stateoriented developmental approach and the urban-rural integration framework launched inherited from Wang Yang (see Table 1 the 'land ticket' was a mechanism for these land to be made available to alternative uses in a way that would enhance the financial position of rural residents migrating into the city. Interestingly, these policies are framed as socially-and market-friendly approaches:
Rural residents can get urban hukou after years of working and living in cities. But when they are settled down, they may need to think about how to deal with their rural land. Without the land ticket system, they may have to leave the land idle or give it to relatives. The land ticket offers them a way to cash in on their land…The land ticket system improved farmers' incomes and offered financial support to migrant workers who left their rural homes. It also better protects farmland and eases the conflict between urban demand and rural supply of land. The system also generates capital to support rural housing renovation and other activities. (Interview with Caixin, 17 September 2015) In an indirect counterpoint to coastal provinces' unwillingness to accommodate migrant workers on a permanent basis (a direct legacy of the 1958 hukou institution),
Huang reveals how Chongqing is increasingly benefitting from a system that keeps migrant inflows in situ through the provision of urban hukou:
In recent years, we have noticed an interesting phenomenon in which Chongqing's foreign trade surges 70 percent to 80 percent in the first quarter every year and drops to a normal level in the following quarters. After analysis, we found it is a bonus from This offers, in turn, a double complication of the developmental story in post-Mao
China.
On the one hand, extensive state involvement in inland economies like
Chongqing is neither a simple residue nor a potential resurgence of Maoist economic governance; it is ironically a reaction -if not retaliation -to the 'first wave' marketization pathway that shifted means of production to coastal provinces like Guangdong. Reflecting on this issue, Liu Guoguang, the former Deputy Head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that the "fundamental" issue regarding inter-regional variations rests in "ownership relations":
The fundamental point of departure of redistribution theory in Marxian political economy [i.e. the official basis of the Chinese economy] is the determination of the redistributive institution by the ownership institution, that ownership relations decide redistributive relations. Yet people often neglect this point. When analyzing the causes of our country's widening rich-poor divide, many origins were proposed, such as the expansion of urban-rural disparity, the sharpening of uneven development between regions, monopolies of specific sectors, corruption, insufficient supply of public goods, slow responses to redistributive needs, etc. All these reasons could be valid and need to be addressed one by one. But these are not the most important reason. (Interview with Chongqing Ribao, 5 August 2011; author's translation)
Referencing the Chongqing experience, Liu adds that the precondition of effective redistribution in China is public ownership:
To address the problem of rich-poor disparity from the realm of redistribution -and redistribution alone -is far from sufficient, it cannot fundamentally reverse the trend of worsening disparity. The problem should be tackled directly from the structure of ownership, it must be dealt with directly from the level of relations of production, from the most basic economic institution; the problem should be solved through fortifying the public ownership institution, only through this could growing rich-poor disparity be precluded and 'common affluence' be attained. (Ibid.) From a discursive angle, Liu's comment corresponds with the previously mentioned oblique critique from Huang Qifan: insofar as the CPC professes to be socialistic, it has to enable more equitable redistribution of profits derived from capital accumulation in the first instance. Where redistribution is ineffective, as Liu suggests has been the case in post-Mao China, the other recourse is through "fortifying the On the whole, these two mechanisms are positioned within a state of impasse, it can also be said to be within a state of equilibrium. The Chinese economy has attained fast growth under this mixed institutional system, but this is also accompanied by serious social and political problems…Both models are attempts to break out of the current impasse. What this means is both models represent feedback to the tensions of the current mixed institutional system. (Qiu, 2011: n.p.) Second, existing research has not highlighted the fact that these "tensions" were more apparent in Guangdong than in Chongqing. Specifically, Wang had to negotiate resistance at both the national and provincial level. At the national scale, the-then The tendency of cadres to maximize contextual conditions for political capital complicate, in turn, the chronological logic of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao's subsequent attempts to address the uneven development associated with Deng's approach. As mentioned earlier, a growing number of migrant workers continue to move to Guangdong, while the faster GDP growth in Guangdong relative to that in Chongqing strongly suggests the coastal-interior economic gap is not about to be bridged in the near future (ref. Figure 1) . Qualitatively, the decision to experiment with national-scale reforms in both the Pearl River Delta (in tandem with Hong Kong and Macau) and Liangjiang New Area (in Chongqing) exemplify further the constitutive importance of inter-regional differentiation for effective national governance. And this foregrounds the fourth conceptually significant point: the history of the post-Mao Chinese political economy is neither linear nor exceptional to the entire national territory.
Indeed, the regulatory logic of the Chinese political economy today is not an outcome of events that occurred coherently in a sequential manner. To follow Duara (1995: 5), this linear-sequential perspective obscures and/or overlooks many aspects of the past:
Because our own historical conceptions have shared so much with the linear History of the nation, we have tended to regard History more as a transparent medium of understanding than as a discourse enabling historical players (including historians) to deploy its resources to occlude, repress, appropriate and, sometimes, negotiate with other modes of depicting the past and, thus, the present and future.
This dynamic view of historical evolution problematizes Steinbock's (2012: n.p.) chronological conception of the Guangdong-Chongqing relationship (ref. section 1).
To Steinbock, change will evolve "from Guangdong to Chongqing". Underpinning this perspective is a logic of temporal progression premised on a revised version of 'trickle down' economics: reforms in one place would eventually spread to other places. The initial development in selected megacities is seen to have triggered an "economic ripple" that "has been washing into new generations of Chinese cities" (Ibid.). While this "trickle across" perspective is plausible theoretically, the previously mentioned economic gap between these two provincial-level regions calls into question its practicality. The differentiated positioning of Guangdong and Chongqing at the global scale to attract foreign investments further accentuates the constitutive effects of local developmental initiatives. It suggests, in turn, that institutional differentiation has become a precondition of sustained central governance; that the "nationally strategic" aspect of local-scale experimentation is not premised on its eventual extension to the national-scale, but in its ability to enhance China's national economic competitiveness in situ.
Conclusion
The Chinese political economy is a dynamic entity constituted by multiple developmental trajectories. Recent debates on two seemingly divergent 'models' in Chongqing and Guangdong has foregrounded the potential contradictions of this dynamism. While existing research has attempted to evaluate these trajectories as outcomes of elite politics or ideological incommensurability, an overlooked but no less important aspect is the connections between these trajectories, Mao-era regulatory policies and the post-1978 system of reciprocal accountability instituted.
Indeed, these variations are rolling interactions between provincial developmental initiatives, overtly encouraged by the central government to stimulate enthusiasm in the reform process, and inherited regulatory institutions to coordinate state formation, some extending back into the late 1940s. This paper is an attempt to foreground and evaluate this relationship within a broader geographical-historical framework.
As this paper has argued, the Chongqing and Guangdong 'models' are not diametrically opposed contemporary phenomena; rather, they exemplified the Deng, however, accepted the inevitability as a future outcome of his policies to integrate China with the global economy and, crucially, he believed this inevitability was revoccable. It was with this vision in mind that Deng planned for uneven development during the 7 th Five-Year Plan (1986 -1990 , with an eye to 'resetting' it to a higher level of 'evenness' in future.
Relative to Mao's approach, which was contingent on space (geo-economic insulation), Deng's was contingent on time (ascertaining a moment for the redistribution of wealth from a more developed belt to the other two). With this temporal deferral, the platform was established for coastal provinces like Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang to develop at a much faster pace than Chongqing and other interior provinces like Gansu, Sichuan and Xinjiang. As it became apparent that attempts at bridging regional disparities were encountering difficulties, provinciallevel governments in the western interior began taking more proactive approaches to raise their respective economic competitiveness. This was done in three ways, It is even possible, as Wang's strategies in both Chongqing and Guangdong demonstrate, to reform one institution (urban-rural dual structure) in one place and maximize the utility of this institution (through relocating non-local labor power) in another (ref. Table 1) . Perhaps more importantly, the resulting inter-regional differentiations exemplify a centralizing logic: the reformers aimed to justify their policies in the 'national interest', which foregrounds the constitutive relationship between subnational socioeconomic conditions and the system of reciprocal accountability.
What this suggests, in turn, is the CPC's attempt at sharing greater power and benefits (fangquan rangli 放权让利) has generated a positive feedback loop: 
Notes
1 The empirical materials presented in this paper draws from fieldwork conducted between February 2012 and January 2013 on a broader, multi-sited project on policy experimentation and the shifting logics of socioeconomic regulation across China. A new round of data collection in Guangdong was undertaken in June and July 2015. Discursive materials from key political actors were sourced and translated by the authors; supporting materials were drawn from direct interviews with CPC cadres, planners and scholars in Guangdong and Chongqing. Often on the advice of these interviewees, further follow up work was done to derive supporting evidence. 2 In that context, it is worth recalling that The Cold War climate had made Mao push for Third Front industrialization in remote parts of China precisely because he perceived pre-existing industrial hubs like Shanghai as vulnerable to American or Russian attacks. As relations with the US continued to thaw following Nixon's visit in 1972, pragmatism eventually led back to the grooming of the southeast as the engine of Chinese growth. The post-Mao strategy of developing the southeast coastal areas of China thus had as much to do with the easing of Cold War tensions as with geographical advantages. See e.g. Naughton (1988) . 3 The fourth SEZ was in Xiamen, Fujian province. 4 Ratios for both Guangdong and China determined by authors' calculation. 5 Of these 'new areas', Hengqin and Qianhai are designated 'sub-provincial' (fushengji 副省级) within the administrative hierarchy, which means they enjoy powers lesser than a province and are now the equivalent of the cities -Zhuhai and Shenzhen, respectively -in which they are located. As both Zhuhai and Shenzhen are already national-level SEZs, Hengqin and Qianhai are popularly termed 'special zones within special zones' (tequzhong de tequ 特区中 的特区). Nansha New Area is currently governed by Guangzhou, which is also of sub-provincial administrative status. It is likely more autonomy will be devolved to administrators in Nansha as it is the largest of the three. 6 The other three province-level cities are along the coast, namely, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. These cities are centrally-governed because they are deemed highly strategic to national political-economic development. 7 As an entity, the 'Republic of China' is no longer recognized by the United Nations. It continues to exist in name, however, with its base on the island of Taiwan, and continues to be recognized internationally by a handful of countries. For a full geo-historical discussion, see Lim (2012) . 8 This was possible because the Mao administration had deliberately emphasized a decentralized mode of governance (see Lim, 2016) .
